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Abstract
We consider a standard insurance economy where consumers are supposed to vote
over menus of insurance contracts: A menu of contracts is majority stable if there
does not exist another menu which is supported by an appropriate majority of
consumers. We compute the smallest level of super majority for which there always
exists a stable menu of contracts, and such that all stable menus of contracts are
Pareto optimal. Lower super majority voting rules may ensure existence of stable
menus if individual states and/or types of consumers are aggregated, but then stable
menus of contracts need not be Pareto optimal: hence a trade-oﬀ between Pareto
optimality and conservativeness of the voting rule is exhibited.
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1 Introduction
We consider a standard insurance economy a` la Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976) with S indi-
vidual states and I types of consumers, where types are characterized by their probability
distributions over the individual states. The type of a consumer is private information.
Since Rothschild & Stiglitz it is known that there need not exist competitive equilibria
where (i) consumers choose between a menu of insurance contracts in order to maximize
utility and (ii) firms produce insurance contracts in order to maximize profit. Moreover if
equilibria exist then they need not be Pareto optimal relative to the available information
(constrained Pareto optimal for short). The source of the market failure is discussed in
Rothschild & Stiglitz and Prescott & Townsend (1984).
In order to get existence and optimality of equilibrium allocations diﬀerent modifica-
tions of the market structure have been considered by Bisin & Gottardi (2000) and Rus-
tichini & Siconolfi (2003). In both latter papers consumers declare their type (they may
lie) and trade state-contingent goods at type-dependent prices. In Rustichini & Siconolfi
there are no firms and a notion of weak equilibrium is introduced for which existence is
proven; but weak equilibria need not be constrained Pareto optimal.
In Bisin & Gottardi the problem is modelled as a consumption externality that comes
through the admissible consumption set: the set of feasible net-trades for consumers is
constrained by incentive compatibility conditions and therefore by the net-trades of all
types. The externalities are internalized through an expansion of the commodity space in
the spirit of Arrow-Lindahl : on top of state contingent commodities, agents trade ‘coasian’
property rights on each other’s consumption. Bisin & Gottardi show that equilibria exist
and are all constrained optimal. Assuming a continuum of consumers in each type, the
Arrow-Lindahl approach to the adverse selection problem is immune to the classical critic
about the validity of assuming price-taking behavior on the markets for rights on external
consumption. But a large number of such markets have to be created (actually SI(I−1));
moreover, since the set of admissible net-trades for a consumer depends on the net-trades
of all types, information about the trades of all types needs to be publicly available.
The present note investigates how this minimal, yet important, complexity of the
market mechanism needed to decentralize constrained Pareto-optimal allocations (in the
presence of adverse selection) translates when the alternative route of a voting mechanism
is followed. Here consumers are supposed to vote over menus of insurance contracts: A
menu of contracts is stable if there does not exist another menu which is supported by an
appropriate majority of the consumers. In general super majority voting rules are needed
to ensure existence of stable menus of contracts and stable menus of contracts need not
be Pareto optimal. However we find that when the rate of super majority is high enough
(i.e., when I contracts with S states are being oﬀered, a rate larger than 1 − 1/I), then
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a stable menu exists and all stable menus are Pareto optimal.
Lower super majority voting rules may ensure existence of stable menus if individual
states and/or types of consumers are aggregated (i.e., when there are K(≤ I) menus of
contracts insuring T (≤ S) groups of individual states, the rate decreases to 1 − 1/KT ),
but at the expense of Pareto optimality. Hence the tradeoﬀ between Pareto optimality
and trading possibilities exhibited in Bisin & Gottardi and Rustichini & Siconolfi is re-
flected here in a tradeoﬀ between Pareto optimality and the conservativeness (level) of
the needed super majority voting rule: the ‘price’ to pay for the first welfare theorem is
either the construction of SI(I−1) new markets for trading external consumptions or the
establishment of a conservative rate of super majority. The higher the number of missing
markets, the higher the needed rate of super majority, a finding that was already made
in Tvede & Cre`s (2005) in the case of incomplete markets.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 the model is outlined; in Section 3
two slightly diﬀerent notions of equilibria are introduced; finally Section 4 discusses the
optimality properties of equilibria.
2 Setup
Consider a standard insurance economy: There is a finite set of individual states S =
{1, . . . , S}; a consumer in state s has the endowment ωs. There is a finite number of types
of consumers I = {1, . . . , I} and a continuum of each type. The fraction of consumers of
type i is ei, where ei > 0 and

i ei = 1. The type of a consumer is private information.
Consumers have the same state utility function u : R+ → R, so each type is charac-
terized by a probability distribution πi = (π1i , . . . ,π
S
i ) over the set of individual states,
where πsi > 0 and

s π
s
i = 1. The fraction of consumers of type i who are in state s is
assumed to be πsi . The consumers are supposed to maximize their expected utility, so the
utility of a consumer of type i choosing the insurance contract x = (x1, . . . , xS) (where
the dividend in state s is non-negative: xs ≥ 0) is

s π
s
iu(x
s). Dividends of contracts
xs are supposed to belong to a compact set C ⊂ R+, and the full insurance contract
xf =

s ω
s

i eiπ
s
i belongs to C.
Both states and types of consumers may be aggregated in order to reduce the complex-
ity of menus of contracts. Let PS = {S1, . . . ,ST} be a partition of S, and suppose that
there is a menu x of K insurance contracts: x = (x1, . . . , xK), where xk = (x
1
k, . . . , x
T
k )
and xtk ∈ C for all k and t. Contracts are exclusive in the sense that consumers may
hold one and only one contract. Furthermore suppose that there is a partition of I:
PI = {I1, . . . , IK} such that contracts are incentive compatible in the sense that con-
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sumers in Ik weakly prefer contract k, so for all i ∈ Ik and kI
Ui(xk) =
3
t
3
s∈St
πsiu(x
t
k) ≥
3
t
3
s∈St
πsiu(x
t
k?) = Ui(xk?)
and that the contracts are feasible, so
3
k
3
t
xtk
3
i∈Ik
ei
3
s∈St
πsi ≤
3
s
ωs
3
i
eiπsi .
For a partition of states and a partition of types P = (PS ,PI) and two menus of
contracts x and xI, let I(x, xI,P) ⊂ I be the set of types which prefer x to xI, so
I(x, xI,P) = ∪k{i ∈ Ik|Ui(xk) > Ui(xIk)} ;
and let ρ(x, xI,P) ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of consumers who prefer x to xI, so
ρ(x, xI,P) =
3
i∈I(x,x?,P)
ei .
3 Equilibrium
We first consider an equilibrium notion where the relative support for diﬀerent menus of
contracts matter, so if x and xI are compared and the support for xI is suﬃciently large
compared with the support for x, then xI defeats x, even if the support for xI is small
compared with the total population.
Definition 1 A menu of contracts x is a relative δ-majority stable equilibrium for
P if:
• x is incentive compatible and feasible, and;
• for all incentive compatible and feasible menus of contracts xI
ρ(xI, x,P) ≤ δρ(x, xI,P).
Theorem 1 Suppose that
δ > min
F
KT − 1,max
i
1
ei
− 1
k
.
Then there exists a relative δ-majority stable equilibrium for P.
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Proof: Contracts are in CKT , but clearly if a menu of incentive compatible contracts
satisfies the feasibility contraint with “>”, then there exists another menu of incentive
compatible contracts such that all types of consumers are better oﬀ. Therefore the relevant
set of contracts F ⊂ CKT is
F = {x ∈ CKT |k

tx
t
k

i∈Ikei

s∈Stπ
s
i =

sω
s

ieiπ
s
i }.
The dimension of F is equal to or less than KT − 1.
Artificial agents are introduced: incentive compatibility agents (ic-agents for short).
Let xf be the menu of identical full insurance contracts, so x
s
fk =

i ei

s? π
s?
i ω
s? for all
k and s. The preference correspondence of the identical ic-agents Pic : F → F is defined
as follows:
Pic(x) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
∅ for x incentive compatible
int B(xf , ,x− xf,) ∩ F otherwise,
where int B(xf , ,x− xf,) is the open ball with center xf and radius ,x− xf,. Since the
set of incentive compatible contracts is closed, the graph of Pic is open. Then, according
to Theorem 3 in Greenberg (1979), there exists a δ-relative equilibrium for the extended
economy as soon as δ > KT − 1 (see Greenberg (1979) for a definition of a δ-relative
equilibrium).
Let eic be the ‘number’ of ic-agents. Consider the extended economy with consumers
and artificial agents, so the total ‘number’ of agents in the extended economy is

i ei +
eic = 1 + eic. Take eic > KT − 1, then the δ-relative equilibrium for the extended
economy is incentive compatible, so it is a relative δ-majority stable equilibrium for P for
the insurance economy.
Clearly, if some consumer prefers xI to x, then all consumers of the same type prefer
xI to x. Therefore if x is a relative δ-majority stable equilibrium for δ > KT − 1, then x
is also a relative δ-majority stable equilibrium for δ > maxi 1/ei − 1.
Q.E.D
Next, we consider an equilibrium notion where the absolute support for diﬀerent con-
tracts matters, so if x and xI are compared and the support for xI is suﬃciently large
compared with the total population, then xI defeats x.
Definition 2 A menu of contracts x is a ρ-majority stable equilibrium for P if:
• x is incentive compatible and feasible, and;
• for all incentive compatible and feasible menus of contracts xI
ρ(xI, x,P) ≤ ρ.
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Corollary 1 Suppose that
ρ > min
F
1− 1
KT
,max
i
1− ei
k
.
Then there exists a ρ-majority stable equilibrium for P.
4 Optimality of equilibria
Clearly the fact that types of consumers is private information should be taken into
account in the notion of Pareto optimality.
Definition 3 A menu of incentive compatible and feasible contracts x is constrained
Pareto optimal if there is no other menu of incentive compatible and feasible contracts
xI where xI = (xI1, . . . , x
I
I) and x
I
i = (x
I1
i , . . . , x
IS
i ), such that no type of consumers is worse
oﬀ and at least one type of consumers is better oﬀ, so Ui(xIi) ≥ Ui(xi) for all i with “>”
for at least one i.
If neither individual states nor types of consumers are aggregated, then equilibrium
menus of contracts are constrained Pareto optimal. Intuitively: if x is not constrained
Pareto optimal, then there exists a menu of contracts xI such that all types are better oﬀ
with xI than with x, and agents would unanismously support the change from x to xI.
Corollary 2 If neither states nor types of consumers are aggregated, so T = S and
K = I, then all equilibria are constrained Pareto optimal.
Reciprocally, if x is constrained Pareto optimal, then for all other menus of incentive
compatible and feasible contracts xI at least one type is better oﬀ with x than with xI;
therefore x is ρ-majority stable as soon as ρ > maxi 1− ei.
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